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IS THE RELATION BETWEEN NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS AND 
PARENT COMPANIES MISLEADING? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether different levels of investor protection affect the equity 
market’s valuation of non-controlling interests (NCIs) in a consolidated corporate entity. 
Using a set of publicly listed European firms, our findings suggest a positive (negative) 
association of NCIs with parent companies’ share prices in countries with low (high) levels of 
investor protection. We interpret the findings as evidence that when non-controlling investors 
are not well-protected, parent companies have an opportunity to extract rents from non-
controlling owners, leading to a positive valuation of NCIs’ equity. However, in countries 
where non-controlling investors are well-protected, parent companies are not able to extract 
rents but still must monitor and govern the related subsidiary; thus, NCIs become a net cost, 
and the relation inverts. 
JEL Classification: M41; M48 
 
Keywords: non-controlling interests; value relevance; investor protection; legal origin; 
institutional characteristics; parent companies 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior literature on the value relevance of non-controlling interests (NCIs) has primarily 
focused on single-country settings and has yielded conflicting results. On the one hand, 
studies of single countries, such as the United States (Swanson, 2010), Taiwan (Hsu et al., 
2012), and Germany (Lopes et al., 2013), have reported negative relations between NCIs and 
share prices. On the other hand, similar single country studies of Spain (Abad et al., 2000) 
and Hong Kong (So and Smith, 2009) have presented evidence of either a positive or no 
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relation (So and Smith, 2009). There is little existing theory to explain these conflicting 
differences in the valuation of NCIs across countries.  In this paper, we explore whether these 
mixed results could be explained by the substantial differences in these countries’ 
institutional environments (Leuz, 2010); particularly different levels of investor protection 
across individual countries.  
NCI is the portion of consolidated shareholders’ equity that is attributable to 
shareholders other than those of the parent company. Although reported within the equity 
section, NCIs are not actually owned by the parent company’s shareholders because the NCIs 
own shares of the parent company’s subsidiaries. Because non-controlling minority 
shareholders do not generally have the ability to monitor their investments directly, parent 
companies can more easily extract rents from these shareholders if the law does not properly 
protect them. Accordingly, the market value of NCIs could be affected, in part, by minority 
shareholder protection in the country and whether the law affords these shareholders 
protection from rent extraction. This country level of minority shareholder protection could 
influence how investors value a less-than-wholly-owned subsidiary. Consistently, it is 
reasonable that shareholder protection laws in an individual country could also influence the 
valuation of the parent company. This protection determines the amount of rents that the 
parent company can extract from the minority shareholders and pass on to the parent 
company’s shareholders. Hence, we suggest that the differences in NCI valuation 
documented by the prior literature could be driven by differences in country-level investor 
protection and law enforcement.  
Our hypotheses are based on the “law and finance” literature (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Lopez-de-Foronda et al., 2007; Schneyder et al., 2018)1. The fundamental assumption in this 
                                                     
1 In 2002, four authors from whose 1997 articles this literature departed (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny) referred to the existence of a “law and finance literature” (La Porta 
et al., 2002). Five year later, Lopez-de-Foronda et al. (2007) mentioned a “law and finance approach”. More 
recently, Schneyder et al. (2018) referred to it as the “law and finance school”.  
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literature is that the ‘law matters’ for economic outcomes” (Schneyder et al., 2018, p. 4). This 
literature is based on the notion of legal origin, distinguishing between “two main secular 
legal traditions” (La Porta et al., 2008, p. 288): common law and civil law2. A further 
distinction is proposed among three different families of civil law: French, German, and 
Scandinavian civil law (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, 2008; Lopez-de-Foronda et al., 
2007). Legal origin is important to this study because it is strongly correlated with the 
different levels of legal protection enjoyed by investors (Lopez-de-Foronda et al., 2007, p. 
1131). Countries with an English legal origin tradition exhibit the highest levels of protection 
of minority investors and creditors, as well as stricter law enforcement, followed by countries 
with German or Scandinavian legal origins and, finally, countries with a French legal origin 
tend to exhibit the lowest levels of shareholder and creditor protection and law enforcement 
(La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, 2008). 
La Porta et al. (2002) provided evidence of a positive association between shareholder 
protection and valuation of assets. These researchers also provided evidence of a positive 
association of cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder with asset valuation, 
particularly in countries characterized by poor investor protection. We attempt to exploit 
variation in investor protection and law enforcement “through the legal system, meaning both 
laws and their enforcement” (La Porta et al., 2000, p. 4), across countries in our paper and 
how investors’ value NCIs across countries. 
We build on this literature and investigate whether the value equity investors in 
countries with higher levels of investor protection and stricter law enforcement value the NCI 
component differently than investors in countries with lower levels of investor protection and 
weaker law enforcement3. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require all 
                                                     
2 La Porta et al. (2008) also mentioned a “socialist” civil law subtradition.  
3 We acknowledge the possibility of having strong investor protection rules but deficient enforcement of such 
rules. Nevertheless, the prior literature has shown that countries in which there is relatively stronger investor 
4 
 
 
countries to report NCIs in the equity section of the consolidated balance sheet. However, the 
claims on and rights of shareholders to these net assets are likely to vary depending on 
countries’ institutional environments. Accordingly, the valuation of the same line item in a 
financial statement can vary from country to country depending on the nature of the 
relationship between parent companies and subsidiaries. The controlling shareholder (the 
parent company) generally incurs the cost of monitoring and governing the subsidiary, 
imposing a cost on the parent company. If the level of non-controlling investor protection is 
strong, the parent company is legally bound to share the appropriate amount of equity with 
the non-controlling investors and might not be able to extract sufficient value to cover the 
costs that they incur. However, if the level of investor protection is weak, the parent company 
can appropriate more assets away from the non-controlling shareholders to cover the costs 
that they incur and even obtain positive net value from their portion of equity.  
To test our hypotheses, we examine a group of five European countries that adopted 
IFRS at the same time (in 2005) but are characterized by three different institutional 
environments with distinct legal origins: 1) French civil law (France and Greece); 2) 
Scandinavian/German civil law (Sweden and Germany); and 3) common law (United 
Kingdom). We examine whether investors in countries with higher levels of investor 
protection differentially value NCIs compared to investors in countries with lower levels of 
investor protection for the period of 2008-2013 using a sample of companies reporting NCIs 
in six consecutive years. We exploit the cross-sectional variation across the countries in legal 
origin to test our hypotheses. As predicted, we find a negative association between NCIs and 
share prices in common law and Scandinavian/German civil law countries but a positive 
association in French-civil law countries. We interpret these findings as supporting our 
presuppositions that countries with strong (weak) levels of investor protection have a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
protection are also characterized by relatively stricter law enforcement. Hereinafter, we therefore use the term 
“investor protection” to refer to both “legal protection of investors and law enforceability”. 
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negative (positive) association between NCIs and parent companies’ share prices. Our 
findings are even more pronounced in countries with the strongest level of investor 
protection.  
This study is the first to undertake this type of cross-country analysis. The setting in 
which the study was conducted enables us to specifically isolate the effect of investor 
protection laws, given that both the reporting and measurement of NCIs (Hsu et al., 2012; 
Lopes et al., 2013; Abad et al., 2000) and the accounting standards (So and Smith, 2009) are 
held constant. Our approach goes beyond Lopes et al. (2013), who only used a sample of 
German firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS early and examined how the market priced NCIs 
(when NCIs were reported either as equity or as non-equity). 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study is the first to 
examine the valuation of NCIs conducted in a cross-country setting; to examine differences 
in valuation across countries; and to provide a possible explanation for the different previous 
results in prior research. It is the first to leverage the institutional environment to draw 
conclusions regarding the relationship between NCIs and the market value of parent 
companies, thereby adding to the literature on the value relevance of NCIs (e.g., So and 
Smith, 2009; Swanson, 2010; Lopes et al., 2013). Second, we add to the area of research 
about how a country’s institutional environment affects firm value, returns, and the reported 
accounting information (e.g., Ali and Hwang, 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 
2006; Bae and Jeong, 2007; DeFond et al., 2007; Hughes, 2009; Chin et al., 2009; Rahman et 
al., 2010; Landsman et al., 2012). In addition, we believe that our study may also be valuable 
for companies and regulatory bodies in light of the awareness that it raises regarding the 
importance of the context in which accounting information is interpreted and the impacts that 
the context has on how investors value such information.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the earlier 
literature and presents the hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design, 
data and sample selection procedures. Section 4 provides the results and discussion. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Research on the value relevance of NCIs is relatively new and not well-developed in 
the literature. Table 1 provides a summary of the main empirical studies of the value 
relevance of NCIs. Abad et al. (2000) analysed Spain and found a small but positive 
association between NCIs and share prices. In Hong Kong, however, So and Smith (2009) 
revealed a negative association between NCIs and parent company share prices before the 
transition to IAS-equivalent standards and no association thereafter. In the United States, 
there is scattered evidence of positive, negative, and zero associations between NCIs and 
parent company share prices, where the cross-sectional variation is driven by firm size 
(Swanson, 2010). In both Taiwan and Germany, a negative relationship between NCIs and 
parent company share prices was found both before and after law changes related to 
accounting for NCIs (Hsu et al., 2012; Lopes et al., 2013). Schmidt (2013) also noted similar 
diversity in the results for the valuation of other hybrid instruments. Clearly, prior studies 
have offered a largely inconsistent results, large variation and several unanswered questions.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Earlier studies have been quite diverse in their scope, conducted on both local (Abad et 
al., 2000; Swanson, 2010) and international (Lopes et al., 2013) accounting standards for 
NCIs. Others have explored the transition from local to international (or equivalent) standards 
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(So and Smith, 2009; Hsu et al., 2012). All these studies used a diverse range of data methods 
and datasets and were based on countries with different legal regimes, including French law 
(Abad et al., 2000), common law (So and Smith, 2009; Swanson, 2010) and German law 
(Hsu et al., 2012; Lopes et al., 2013). 
Prior studies were almost exclusively conducted in a single-country setting resulting in 
a dearth of cross-country research on this topic. One exception is Lopes and Lourenço (2014), 
who found empirical evidence that firm-level and country-level variables affect firms’ 
decisions to engage in partial acquisitions. However, they focused on a different empirical 
question, which was not related to the market value of parent companies. We propose that 
additional cross-country research is needed to help explain the seemingly inconsistent results 
reported in the earlier literature.  
Over the past several decades, political economy studies have accumulated a wealth of 
evidence suggesting that countries have different levels of: outside investors’ rights and risks 
of expropriation (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998); private benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004); rules of law (Kaufman et al., 2003); public enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008); and 
ownership concentrations (Barth et al., 2008). For instance, studies have found a correlation 
between the development of capital markets and companies’ ownership structures (Pagano 
and Volpin, 2001) where more developed capital markets can sustain less concentrated 
ownership structures because the risks of expropriation by managers and controlling 
shareholders are substantially reduced due to higher-quality legal protection for investors and 
stricter enforcement of the law (Pagano and Volpin, 2001).  
Developed countries continue to show similar patterns of behaviour that can be traced 
back to their legal origin (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; Djankov 
et al., 2008; Leuz, 2010; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006; Hughes, 
2009). A well-established literature has found that the common law legal system provides 
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more protection of shareholder rights than the civil law legal system. Countries in which the 
law is based on the English common-law tradition tend to exhibit higher levels of protection 
of minority investors and creditors, as well as stricter law enforcement, compared to countries 
in which the law is based on the French civil code. Countries in which the legal origins are 
German or Scandinavian present intermediate levels of shareholders and creditor protection 
and law enforcement (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, 2008). In common law countries, the 
prevailing corporate conflict is between shareholders and managers, who are expected to run 
the company for shareholders’ benefit. In civil law countries, the main conflict arises between 
majority dominant shareholders and their minority counterparts (López-de-Foronda et al., 
2007).  
Distinguishing only between the common law and civil law traditions, La Porta et al. 
(2002) provided evidence pertaining to the association of investor protection (measured 
alternatively by a common law dummy and an antidirector rights score) and cash-flow 
ownership with firm valuation. These authors suggested that outside investors are willing to 
pay higher prices for assets when the law affords greater protection of their rights. These 
researchers recognized that when investor rights are well-protected by law, “more of the 
firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being 
expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm” (La Porta et al., 2002, p. 1147). 
Using a sample of 539 firms from 27 countries, they found that better shareholder protection 
is associated with higher valuations of assets; particularly in countries where investor 
protection is strong. The researchers also found that higher cash-flow ownership by the 
controlling shareholder is associated with higher valuation, particularly in countries in which 
investor protection is poor. 
The finance literature has shown that large investors with private benefits of control can 
expropriate minority shareholders, usually when the different types of shareholders’ interests 
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are not aligned (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Small, non-controlling, and non-strategic 
shareholders do not have the power to govern the financial and operating policies of the 
entity, since each one has a small amount of power and insufficient incentive to engage in 
monitoring (Kandel et al., 2011). In an environment with low levels of investor protection, 
the controlling parent might have enough leeway to extract rents from the subsidiary since the 
expected cost to the parent company of this behaviour is low. Thus, wealth might be 
redistributed from non-controlling shareholders to controlling shareholders (Ho and Wong, 
2001; Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Bozec and Laurin, 2008). This redistribution can be 
achieved by diverting companies’ resources for their own use, transferring assets out of 
subsidiaries, or committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide private benefits (Lin et 
al., 2011). Therefore, if the value gained (wealth creation and expropriation) exceeds the 
value actually allocated to NCI shareholders, one should anticipate a positive relationship 
between reported NCIs and the valuation of parent companies. NCIs can affect the market 
value of equity through investor perceptions of the appropriation of resources from such 
owners.  
Based upon the above discussion, our first hypothesis is the following:  
 
H1: NCIs reported in consolidated financial statements are positively associated with 
the market price of parent companies’ shares in countries with low levels of investor 
protection.  
 
The arguments made above also suggest two additional hypotheses. In environments 
with high levels of investor protection, parent companies bear the costs of control, but they 
face greater pressure to share wealth creation with minority shareholders since they cannot 
easily extract rents from them because of strong legal institutions. This expectation leads 
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many controlling shareholders to even deem their dealings with minority shareholders as 
hindrances to an agile response to competitive pressures (Croci and Petmezas, 2010). The 
potential shift of wealth from controlling shareholders to NCIs – as well as the ability of the 
latter to demand monitoring and accounting information that is both timely and of high 
quality, and to free ride at the expense of the former – can be so costly to parent companies 
that markets discount the parent company’s firm value. If the potential benefits of synergies 
and the additional capital provided by other shareholders do not compensate for the potential 
costs of control, one should anticipate a negative relationship between NCIs and the market 
valuation of parent companies. Hence, NCIs can negatively affect the market value of equity 
through investors’ perceptions of the parent company’s monitoring. Additionally, the 
magnitude of agency costs and expected litigation costs (La Porta et al., 2006) from 
shareholders in a highly protected environment can also justify a negative relationship 
between NCIs and the market value of the parent company. This discussion leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2: NCIs reported in consolidated financial statements are negatively associated with 
the market price of parent companies’ shares in countries with high levels of investor 
protection.  
 
Not only do we hypothesize a negative relationship between NCIs and the market 
valuation of parent companies in countries which achieve a certain threshold of high investor 
protection, but we also expect this relationship to be stronger in countries with higher levels 
of investor protection. When the protection of investors is greater, the parent company’s 
ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders are substantially reduced and can 
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even be zero. Thus, the magnitude of the negative relationship should be related to the 
strength of investor protection. This discussion leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The negative association of NCIs with the market price of parent companies’ 
shares is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of investor protection. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Sample selection, data, and analysis of institutional characteristics 
Our sample consists of firms from a set of European countries that adopted IFRS in 
2005. We investigate whether investors in countries with higher levels of investor protection 
and law enforceability value NCIs differently than investors in countries with lower levels of 
investor protection and law enforceability for the period of 2008 to 2013 using a sample of 
companies reporting NCIs in six consecutive years. We remove the period of 2005 to 2007 
from our sample to avoid any bias sue to the learning process in the adoption of IFRS, to 
which Kvaal and Nobes (2012) referred in their analysis of IFRS adoption in Australia, the 
UK, France, Spain, and Germany. These researchers’ findings showed that French and 
Spanish firms made more changes after the transition than at the time of the transition to 
IFRS, perhaps because of a learning process. 
We also note that IFRS 3 – Business Combinations changed in 2008, allowing 
companies to alter the way in which they measure the NCIs at the acquisition date. While the 
amount of NCIs was previously determined as the proportional interest in the identifiable 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed, the new version of IFRS 3 permits a free choice 
between measuring NCI at its’ proportionate share of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets 
excluding NCI’s share of goodwill (partial goodwill approach) or at the fair value of net 
12 
 
 
assets including the NCI’s share of goodwill (full goodwill approach). This free choice can be 
applied by the same entity on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and it can lead to differences 
in the outcome of NCIs. The amount of NCIs (and the related goodwill figure) are likely to be 
lower when NCIs are measured at proportionate share of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets, 
rather than at fair value. 
However, this option applies only to NCIs resulting from new business combinations 
and not to NCIs previously recognized. Additionally, there is empirical evidence that only a 
small number of companies use the option of measuring NCIs at fair value, which is 
considered an indication of some lack of popularity for this new alternative (Tsalavoutas et 
al., 2014). André et al. (2016) also documented that there is no significant increase in 
goodwill levels, at least until 2015, that could arise from the measurement of NCIs at fair 
value. Therefore, our results are likely not sensitive to this option of measuring NCIs by the 
partial or full goodwill approaches.  
The accounting and market data used in our analysis were collected from the Thompson 
Worldscope© database. We excluded banks and other financial institutions. To be included in 
our main sample, we required that each country fulfil all the following requirements: i) have 
companies reporting positive NCIs every year for the period studied; ii) have non-negative 
equity attributable to the parent company’s shareholders; and iii) have at least 50 firm 
observations with NCIs each year. Given the nature of this study (value relevance), we found 
it necessary to require a significant number of observations for each country and analyse a set 
of companies that usually have NCIs as a permanent source of finance (every year). At the 
same time, we collected information from companies without NCIs in any year in the sample 
period in these five countries applying all of the other selection procedures. Table 2 reports 
the sample selection with the total number of companies, split between those with NCIs (our 
main sample) in every year and those without NCIs in any year within our sample period.  
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[Table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents the final sample distribution by country (Panel A) and by industry 
(Panel B). The first column shows the total number of firm-year observations included in the 
sample. The other columns reflect data for firm-year observations with and without NCIs 
reported in their consolidated financial statements. Panel A of Table 3 reveals that of 8,652 
firm-year observations, there are 3,538 firm-year observations with NCIs across the five 
countries. The greatest number of firm-year observations with NCIs comes from France 
(1,187) followed in by Germany (930), the United Kingdom (720), Sweden (354), and 
Greece (347). Additionally, the set of companies without NCIs reported in consolidated 
financial statements during the period under analysis comprises 5,114 firm-year observations 
across the five countries. The greatest number of firm-year observations without NCIs comes 
from the United Kingdom (2,598), followed by Germany (869), Sweden (844), France (510), 
and Greece (293). Panel B of Table 3 shows that in each country, manufacturing is the 
dominant industry followed by the services industry, except for Greece, in which the second 
most dominant industry is wholesale and retail trade. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
In untabulated tests, there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of 
NCI firm-year observations for each country (Chi-square test).. The United Kingdom has the 
lowest proportion of firms reporting NCIs (22%) followed by Sweden (30%), Germany 
(52%), Greece (54%), and France (70%). These results are consistent with the findings of 
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Lopes and Lourenço (2014)4. Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of independent sample t-
tests to describe differences between firms with and without NCIs. We compare firm size 
(measured using market capitalization), leverage (debt/equity), and return on equity. The 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden show significant differences between firms with and 
without NCIs for all three variables. Similar results are found for France and Greece (except 
in the case of return on equity). These findings suggest that differences exist between firms 
with and without NCIs in our sample.  
The five countries in our sample have very different institutional characteristics, 
which permit a robust cross-section analysis. Table 4, Panel A, offers details regarding these 
differences. The variables are based on Leuz’s (2010) summary measures of within-country 
legal environments. Column 1 presents a classification of countries based on whether they 
adhere to civil law (Sweden, German, France, and Greece) or common law (United 
Kingdom). Column 2 indicates the cultural region: English speaking (ES, United Kingdom) 
or Western Europe (WE, all of the others). The other columns provide scores for each 
country that capture other institutional characteristics, such as anti-director rights, ex-ante and 
ex-post control, public enforcement, and the rule of law. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Table 4, Panel B, presents the scores for the same institutional characteristics but for a 
greater number of countries (among which are our sampled countries) grouped by legal 
origins (Leuz, 2010; Djankov et al., 2008). Panel B agrees with Leuz (2010) and Djankov et 
al. (2008), who noted that when a set of different countries is considered, countries with an 
                                                     
4 Lopes and Lourenço (2014) examined firm-level and country-level conditions affecting a company’s decision 
to engage in partial acquisitions through the existence or non-existence of NCIs in 14 European countries. They 
found that size, leverage, profitability, cross-listing, internationalization and institutional characteristics play 
important roles in explaining the likelihood of engaging in a partial acquisition. We use this paper to justify the 
determinants of the choice of reporting NCIs and to apply the Heckman procedure (bias selection).  
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English (common law) legal origin tend to have, on average, stronger shareholder and 
creditor rights (antidirectors’ rights) and stronger private and public protection against self-
dealing (ex-ante and ex-post control). In contrast, the averages of the rule of law index and of 
the public enforcement of self-dealing tend to be higher in countries belonging to German 
and Scandinavian legal origins. Panel B shows that notwithstanding the robustness of 
institutional clusters around the world, scores on individual institutional characteristics can be 
higher or lower for a specific country or for the cluster in which a specific country is 
included. Although recent studies have continued to use legal origin as a proxy for investor 
protection (e.g., Chin et al., 2009; Ferreira et al., 2012; Hail, 2013; Hong, 2013), other 
institutional characteristics linked to investor protection beyond legal origin are important as 
well, and they will be included in our analysis.  
 
3.2 Research methodology 
Following the prior literature on the value relevance of accounting numbers, we 
developed a regression model based on Ohlson’s (1995) equity valuation model5. To test 
hypotheses 1 and 2, we add NCIs to the traditional model and measure book value of equity 
without NCIs. The first model is the following:  
 
𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 +∝2 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝3 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +∝4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝5 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑛 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
 
MV is the market value of equity at fiscal year-end6; BV is the book value of equity 
attributable to the parent company shareholders; and NI is net income attributable to the 
                                                     
5 Although this valuation model does not accurately portray all aspects of real firms, it is the basis for empirical 
accounting capital markets research and is an established, parsimonious, and well-accepted valuation theory 
(Barth and Clinch, 2009). 
6 The price of parent company shares three months after fiscal year end was also used as a dependent variable. 
The results (not tabulated) and the main conclusions remain similar. 
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parent company shareholders. To mitigate scale effect problems, the variables are deflated by 
the number of shares outstanding, resulting in a per share basis analysis. 
LOSS is an indicator variable that assumes the value of 1 for companies with negative 
NI and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term NI x LOSS reflects how the 
market’s valuation of losses differs from its valuation of profits. To the extent that losses are 
more weakly associated with a company’s market value than profits, we expect that α3 < 0. 
Some studies (e.g. Rees and Thomas, 2010) have also included the interaction of earnings 
with a binary variable for cases in which earnings are negative, and so do we. 
The main variable of interest in this study, NCI, is defined as the amount of subsidiary 
equity not attributable, either directly or indirectly, to the parent company, and it represents 
the amount displayed as equity in the consolidated financial statements at fiscal year-end. If 
the market values the NCIs, the coefficient on the variable NCI, α5, will be statistically 
significant and different from zero. If NCIs have a positive impact on firm value, the 
coefficient on NCI, α5, will be positive; if NCIs have a negative impact on firm value, the 
coefficient on NCI, α5, will be negative.  
We also include a set of firm-specific control variables (FIRM_CONTROLS). Auditing 
(AUD) and cross-listing (XLIST) have often been used in the previous literature to control for 
law enforcement and financing growth opportunities. Auditors can be used for better law 
enforcement, and they can reduce information asymmetry (e.g., Barth et al., 2008; Khalil et 
al., 2008). Cross-listing on other stock exchanges is often undertaken by companies 
domiciled in countries with poor investor protection as a sign of a better commitment to 
protect their investors and to mitigate the constraints that they face when attempting to 
finance growth opportunities externally (e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002; O’Connor, 2006; 
Bae and Jeong, 2007). Cross-listing is also a proxy for monitoring effects with a positive 
influence on value relevance (e.g., Bae and Jeong, 2007). We incorporate AUD and XLIST as 
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binary variables that assume the value of 1 for companies audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 
for companies listed on more than one stock exchange, respectively, and 0 otherwise. We 
also include industry (IND) and year (YEAR) fixed effects.  
Our sample is comprised of listed firms that voluntarily engage in partial acquisitions 
(recognizing NCIs) and therefore do not represent a random selection of all listed firms in 
each country. Given that we examine the value relevance of NCIs for firms that voluntarily 
engage in partial acquisitions, it is possible that our results are affected by self-selection bias. 
To control for the effects of self-selection bias, we implement the two-stage switching 
regression procedure suggested by Heckman (1976, 1979) and Lee (1976, 1978).  
This econometric procedure offers a means of correcting for non-randomly selected 
samples. The procedure has been applied in several studies of the value relevance of 
accounting information (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Lourenço et al., 2014) and of 
the decision to engage in partial acquisitions (e.g., Lopes et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2018) and in 
other accounting studies. These studies use a broad set of firm characteristics likely to 
influence the results of non-random sample selection (e.g., Drake et al. 2014; Beuselinck et 
al., 2017). In all of these studies, the inverse Mills ratio is used to alleviate the effects of any 
potential selection bias.  
The inverse Mills ratio is a control variable that captures all unobserved differences 
between two groups of firms due to self-selection (in this case, firms with and without non-
controlling interests). This variable is computed in the first stage of the Heckman procedure 
(in which we model the firms’ decisions to engage in partial acquisitions and thus report non-
controlling interests), and it is added in the second stage (equity valuation model). This 
variable, when included in the equity valuation Model 1, will remove the variance from the 
error term due to self-selection, so the coefficients on the other variables included in the 
model can be correctly estimated.  
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In the first stage of the two-stage switching regression procedure, we model our sample 
firms’ decisions to engage in partial acquisitions (recognizing NCI). In the second stage, we 
correct for self-selection by incorporating the inverse Mills ratio computed in the first stage 
as an additional explanatory variable (FIRM_CONTROLS) in the price regressions in our 
value relevance analysis.  
To analyse our sample firms’ decisions to engage in partial acquisitions (first stage of 
the Heckman procedure), we use a binary logit model in which the dependent variable equals 
1 for firms with NCIs and 0 for the firms that do not rely on NCIs as a source of finance for 
the group’s activities. Following prior studies, such as Lopes and Lourenço (2014) and Lopes 
et al. (2013), we predict that the decision to engage in partial acquisitions (recognizing NCI) 
depends on firm characteristics (size, leverage, profitability, and industry). More formally, we 
begin by estimating the following logit model: 
 
𝑁𝐶𝐼_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (2) 
 
where NCI_FIN is a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 for firms reporting 
NCIs every year during the entire sample period and 0 for firms that do not report NCIs; ROE 
is the company’s return on equity; LEV is the company’s leverage, measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets; and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
This model is estimated with industry and year fixed effects.  
In this first stage of the Heckman procedure, we estimate the inverse Mills ratio by 
using a logit model. We are aware that some other studies use a probit model, instead of a 
logit model, but both models predict the probability of the dependent variable to be one. The 
difference between these two models relies on the statistical distribution that is used: 
standardized normal (probit) or logistic (logit). Having in mind the behaviour of the 
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distributions, the predicted values are very close in the central tendency of the distributions; 
only in the extremes the differences can appear but they are not much significant. Thus, the 
results would be not strongly different. However, in order to clarify this, we also estimated 
Equation (2) by using a probit model and the conclusions of this study remain the same. 
After running Model 2, the inverse Mills ratio is computed and included as an 
additional explanatory variable in Model 1 (FIRM_CONTROLS). Hence, all of the analyses 
performed with Model 1, in the second stage of the Heckman procedure, control for the self-
selection bias that can result from voluntarily engaging in partial acquisitions. 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the Heckman procedure is applied separately for each of the 
five countries under analysis: France, Greece, Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
The results of the OLS regression based on Model 1 allow us to identify the sign of the 
coefficient on the variable NCI, α5, and compare it amongst the different countries.  
We expect opposite signs for α5 in the cases of France/Greece (French civil law) and 
the United Kingdom (common law). We also expect that Sweden and Germany 
(Scandinavian/German civil law) follow the behaviour of common law countries. Although 
they are usually positioned in an intermediate place in terms of investor protection (La Porta 
et al, 1998), they show the highest scores regarding public enforcement and high rule of law 
indices (Leuz, 2010) (see Panel A, Table 4). Therefore, we expect a negative sign for α5 in 
the cases of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom and a positive sign in the cases of 
France and Greece. 
In addition to the analysis by country, we also perform an analysis with the pooled 
sample using the following models: 
 
𝑁𝐶𝐼_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
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𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 +∝2 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝3 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∝4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝5 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝6 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑡 +∝7 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
∝𝑛 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4) 
 
In Model 3, PROT and ENF are two country-specific variables7. PROT is an index of 
anti-director rights (an aggregate measure of minority shareholders’ rights), and ENF pertains 
to public enforcement of anti-self-dealing provisions, and it measures available fines and 
sanctions from public enforcers, as defined by Leuz (2010) and Djankov et al. (2008). 
Although, as mentioned in the introduction, the prior literature has shown that countries in 
which there is relatively stronger investor protection are also characterized by a relatively 
higher level of law enforcement, we acknowledge the possibility of having relatively stronger 
investor protection rules but relatively weaker enforcement of such rules. Consequently, 
different valuations of NCIs might be due not only to the investor protection rules but also to 
differences in the degree of enforcement of such rules. We capture these possible effects 
using PROT and ENF in the sample with all of the countries. ROE, LEV, and SIZE are the 
same firm variables as used in Model 2. 
In Model 4, the variable HIGH is a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 for firms 
from countries with a higher level of investor protection, namely, the Scandinavian/German 
civil-law countries (Sweden and German) and the common-law countries (the United 
Kingdom) and 0 otherwise. The French-civil law countries (with the lowest level investor 
protection) serve as the baseline category to which the other countries (higher investor 
protection) are compared, and French-civil law countries assume a HIGH value of 0. We 
estimate this model with industry and year fixed effects and the same firm control variables 
                                                     
7 An additional analysis was performed to include all of the other selected institutional characteristics by country 
(see Table 4). We run the same Heckman specification pooling all observations, using all of the indices 
presented in Table 4, panel A (anti-director rights, ex-ante control, ex-post control, public enforcement and rule 
of law), to capture omitted variables associated with other institutional factors when pooling firm-year 
observations from different countries. However, due to the high correlation between all of the scores, we add 
two at a time. The results (not tabulated) are similar regardless of the scores included. 
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used in Model 1. We also include in Model 4 the inverse Mills ratio computed based on 
Model 3 as an additional firm control variable (Heckman procedure). 
We expect α5 to be positive and statistically significant and α7 to be negative, 
statistically significant, and higher than α5 in absolute terms, which means that the association 
between NCI and MV is positive in the sub-sample of firms from countries with low levels of 
investor protection (hypothesis 1) and it is negative in the sub-sample of firms from countries 
with high levels of investor protection (hypotheses 2), being the coefficient of the variable 
NCI for this last group of firms given by the difference between α7 and α5.  
To test hypothesis 3, assessing whether the negative association of NCIs with the 
market price of parent companies’ shares is more pronounced in countries with higher levels 
of investor protection, we also apply the Heckman procedure to the entire sample. In the first 
stage of this procedure, we use again Model 3. In the second stage, we extend Model 4 and 
end up with the following Model 5: 
 
𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 +∝2 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝3 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡+ ∝4 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝5 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝6 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑡 +∝7 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
∝8 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +∝9 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑛 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (5) 
 
where the variable HIGHEST is a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 for firms 
from countries with the highest level of investor protection, specifically the United Kingdom, 
and 0 otherwise. The other variables remain as in Model 4. We estimate this model with 
industry and year fixed effects, using the same firm control variables used in Models 1 and 4 
and including the inverse Mills ratio computed based on Model 3. 
We expect the coefficient on HIGHESTxNCI, α9, to be negative, significantly different 
from zero, and higher in absolute terms than α5 and α7 (consistent with H3). Such a 
relationship would confirm that the negative association of NCIs with the prices of parent 
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companies’ shares is more pronounced in countries with the highest level of investor 
protection.  
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics. Panels A, B, and C show data for French civil-
law countries (France and Greece), Scandinavian/German law countries (Germany and 
Sweden), and the common law country (the United Kingdom), respectively. The mean and 
median of the market value per share (MV) are substantially higher than the book value (BV) 
in all of the countries (except for Greece). There are differences in the mean values of all of 
the variables between countries, and the median is lower than the mean for most of the 
continuous variables in each country, revealing distributions that are skewed to the left.  
 
[Table 5] 
 
Table 6 presents partial correlations to explore whether significant relations exist 
between NCI and MV in all countries. We present the partial correlation of these two 
variables after controlling for: i) book value of the equity (BV) and income (NI); and ii) all of 
the variables included in the OLS regressions (Models 1, 4, and 5). The coefficient for NCI is 
positive in the cases of France and Greece and negative in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
Germany. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses. We also calculate the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables included in the OLS regressions. None of the 
maximum VIFs exceeds 6, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious problem8.  
 
                                                     
8 As a rule of thumb, one can consider multicollinearity as harmful when the VIF exceeds 10 (Johnston, 1984). 
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[Table 6] 
 
4.2 Regression results and discussion 
Before running our OLS regressions using Model 1 (hypotheses 1 and 2) separately for 
each country and Models 4 and 5 for the pooled sample, we run the binary logistic 
regressions presented in Models 2 and 3. The results of this intermediate step are included in 
Table 7. Consistent with findings for a German sample (Lopes et al., 2013) and a European 
sample (Lopes and Lourenço, 2014), we find a positive association between the variables 
SIZE and LEV and the probability of reporting NCIs. The estimated value from the binary 
logistic regression is used to generate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. This ratio 
is then added to Model 1 as a new control variable, as mentioned in the research methodology 
section.  
 
[Table 7] 
 
Table 8 then reports the results of tests of H1 and H2 (Models 1 and 4), with 
corrections for heteroscedasticity (White test) and after assuring that all of the coefficients are 
at conventional levels after estimating VIF and Durbin-Watson statistics.  
 
[Table 8] 
 
The empirical results highlight the value relevance of summary accounting measures. 
The coefficient estimates for the variables BV and NI and for the interaction variable LOSS 
with NI are consistent with those reported in earlier value relevance studies. It seems that the 
firms’ BV and NI are statistically and positively related to the market value of the firm’s 
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equity. However, similar to the findings of prior research (e.g. Hayn, 1995; Rees and 
Thomas, 2010), the market valuation of losses is significantly lower than the market 
valuation of profits.  
The use of a model that distinguishes between profitable and nonprofitable firms does 
not influence our results. We performed sensitivity analyses excluding the variable LOSS and 
the interaction term of LOSS with Net Income, and the results remain unchanged.  
The results of testing Model 1 by country show that the variable NCI has explanatory 
power for the prices of parent companies’ shares for all countries (all the coefficients on 
NCIs, α5, are significantly different from zero). More precisely, as predicted, NCIs are 
statistically significantly positive in France (α4 = 0.640; p-value < 0.01) and Greece (α4 = 
0.999; p-value < 0.01). In contrast, NCIs are statistically significantly negative in Sweden (α4 
= -2.248; p-value < 0.05), Germany (α4 = -1.003; p-value < 0.01), and the United Kingdom 
(α4 = -2.254; p-value < 0.01), in line with hypotheses 1 and 2.  
We find a positive relationship between reported NCIs and the value of parent 
companies’ shares in countries in which the institutional characteristics favour weaker 
investor protection. Our findings suggest that the amount of NCI is positively associated with 
share prices in France and Greece. Consequently, it seems that parent companies’ ability to 
control NCIs has positive value. These findings justify why a greater number of companies in 
French-civil law countries use NCIs as alternative sources of equity financing and why most 
subsidiaries are partially owned by parent companies. H1 is supported.  
In countries with higher investor protection, as argued above, we find the opposite 
result. Our findings for the United Kingdom are consistent with the idea that, in common-law 
countries – where institutional characteristics provide stronger investor protection – the cost 
of control rests solely with the parent company, and benefits of business combinations are 
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shared with NCIs. Our findings regarding the value relevance of NCIs in Germany9 and 
Sweden are similar to those of the United Kingdom. In both cases, there is a negative 
association between NCIs and the prices of parent company shares. These results are in line 
with Croci and Petmezas (2010), who stated that higher levels of investor protection favour 
minority interests. Thus, it seems that investors expect the potential costs of control to exceed 
any wealth appropriation, which explains why the market reacts negatively to reported NCIs 
in common-law countries. Our results could explain why fewer companies in the United 
Kingdom use NCIs as alternative sources to finance equity and why most subsidiaries are 
wholly owned by parent companies. H2 is also supported. 
Results from testing Model 4 confirm our expectations, and both H1 and H2 are 
simultaneously supported. The coefficient on NCI (our benchmark for French civil law 
countries, with low investor protection) is statistically positive, as predicted (α5 = 0.522; p-
value < 0.000). The coefficient on the interaction for countries with high investor protection 
(HIGHxNCI) is negative and statistically significant (α7 = -0.806; p-value < 0.05), which 
means that the variable NCI impacts differently on MV (dependent variable), depending on 
whether the dummy HIGH equals 1 or 0. If HIGH is zero (France and Greece), the investor 
protection is low and the positive slope of α5 suggests that the relationship between NCI and 
MV is positive (α5 = 0.522). When HIGH is 1, countries with high investor protection are 
grouped, and the interaction HIGHxNCI (α7 = -0.806) is negative, inverting the relationship 
of NCI and MV (the variation of 1 in NCI has an impact of -0.284 (=0.522-0.806) in the 
dependent variable). Additional tests (not tabulated) dividing the sample into two 
independent groups (France/Greece and United Kingdom/Germany/Sweden) and running the 
same Model 1 in the separate groups produce similar results. The support of both H1 and H2 
                                                     
9 This finding for German firms corroborates prior findings reported by Lopes et al. (2013), who demonstrated 
that investors did not change their perceptions of NCIs when they were reported within equity, rather than 
outside of equity. 
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suggests the importance of investor protection when pricing the equity of subsidiaries 
attributable to shareholders other than those from parent companies.  
Table 9 reports results for Model 5 (hypothesis 3). This table documents that the 
negative association of NCIs with the prices of parent companies’ shares is more pronounced 
in countries with the highest level of investor protection, specifically, in our sample, only the 
United Kingdom.  
 
[Table 9] 
 
The estimate for the coefficient on NCIs, α5, our initial benchmark, remains positive 
as before and statistically significant at the 1% level. Indeed, the estimate for the coefficient 
α7, on the interaction of a high level of investor protection (HIGH) and NCIs, HIGHxNCI, 
allows us to differentiate the impact of NCIs on MV in two different sets of countries, as 
before. When HIGH (Sweden, German, UK) is 1, the estimate for the interaction term 
HIGHxNCI is statistically significant and negative (α7 = -0.576; p-value < 0.05), indicating 
that, in countries with a high level of investor protection, when NCIs increase by 1 the 
expected variation on MV is -0.031 (=0.545-0.576). The impact of NCI when countries with 
a low level of protection are considered (France, Greece) is positive, and the estimate for the 
coefficient is 0.545. These findings confirm our previous results about the inverse 
relationship of NCIs and MV in countries with high versus low level of investor protection 
(hypotheses 1 and 2). 
 However, we now (in Model 5) added the interaction of the highest level of investor 
protection (HIGHEST) and NCIs, HIGHESTxNCI, which allow us to differentiate the impact 
of NCIs on MV in the country with the highest level of protection (in our data, the UK), from 
the one in other countries with a high (but not the highest) level of investor protection 
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(Sweden and Germany). When HIGHEST (the UK) is 1, the estimate for the interaction term 
HIGHESTxNCI is statistically significant and negative (α9 = -8.527; p-value < 0.05), 
indicating that in the country with the highest level of investor protection (the UK), when 
NCI increases by 1 the expected variation on MV is -8.558 (=0.545-0.576-8.527). Thus, 
matched to the other countries, the impact of NCIs on MV is highest (in absolute terms) in 
the UK and remains negative, when compared to Sweden and German (hypothesis 3). 
Otherwise, compared to France and Greece, the impact is greater but with the opposite sign.  
The overall results suggest that in the case of parent companies located in countries 
with higher investor protection, the relationship between NCIs and MV is negative, but this 
negative relationship is markedly higher in the UK, which has the highest level of protection. 
The magnitude of the coefficient does not mean that there is only one influence on the MV 
because the regression includes several other variables that also influence the dependent 
variable. The results suggest only that higher investor protection environments, especially the 
highest ones, can drive the negative relationship of NCIs with MV. Scores for other 
institutional characteristics beyond legal origin are included, as before. Specifically, the 
scores are included in the inverse Mills ratio computed with pooled observations.  
The findings provide strong evidence supporting the idea that the negative association 
between NCIs and firm value is more pronounced in countries with the highest level of 
investor protection; in our case, the UK. H3 is supported.  
Finally, we report the results of an additional examination regarding whether 
differences exist between Greece and France. These two countries are included together with 
many countries in the same legal tradition (see Panel B, Table 4), and both have the same 
score for Public Enforcement when individually considered (see Panel B, Table A). However, 
their single scores regarding anti-director rights and the rule of law are different (see Panel B, 
Table A) and suggest that France presents a higher level of outside investor protection, as 
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well as superior overall legal quality. To examine whether differences between these two 
countries exist, we only selected the observations from Greece and France and used the exact 
same methodology as in the previous analyses. We ran the same binary logit regression used 
in the first stage, calculated the new inverse Mills ratio, and performed the OLS regression 
including this variable, as well as a binary variable (assuming 1 for Greek observations) and 
its interaction with the variable NCI. The results (not tabulated) show that the main variable 
NCI continues to have a positive association with the market price of parent companies’ 
shares and that this association is neither mitigated nor intensified in the case of Greece.  
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates whether different levels of investor protection affect the 
association of NCIs with the prices of parent companies’ shares. We use a set of European, 
publicly listed firms and find a positive association between NCIs and the prices of parent 
companies’ shares in the cases of France and Greece and a negative association in the cases 
of United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden. The findings suggest that there is a positive 
association of NCIs with parent companies’ share prices in countries with the lowest level of 
investor protection and a negative association in countries with higher levels. Moreover, we 
show that the negative association between NCIs and the price of parent companies’ shares is 
more pronounced in the country with the highest level of investor protection (United 
Kingdom).  
Our study extends the emerging literature on NCIs by providing an explanation for 
earlier mixed findings on the valuation of NCIs, and it shows the need to control for the 
ability to expropriate NCIs. We extend the insights of La Porta et al. (2002) to the area of 
financial reporting. These authors concluded that, for companies with a controlling 
shareholder, Tobin’s q rises significantly as one moves from civil law countries to common 
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law countries, ceteris paribus. We offer evidence for how these characteristics are related to 
the way in which accounting numbers are perceived by the share market. 
Among the implications of our study, we would like to emphasize the awareness that 
it is likely to raise about the importance of the context in which accounting information is 
interpreted and the impacts that this context has on how investors value such information. 
There are also implications for research. In light of our results, the claims that single-country 
analyses are of limited importance seem to be mistaken. In contrast, we firmly believe that in-
depth analyses of individual countries should be encouraged. This type of analysis should be 
part of a collective effort that, while consisting of a series of single-country studies, would 
provide a complete and unabridged understanding of the institutional realities.  
Our study also presents practical implications for companies and for regulatory 
bodies. Companies would be well-advised to consider the national contexts in relation to the 
information that they disclose and the way it is interpreted and valued by investors. 
Regulatory bodies concerned with the harmonization of financial reporting should 
contemplate the influence of the institutional backgrounds of the countries that they are 
considering.  
 
Our paper also has several limitations. One is that it analyses only five countries, all 
from the EU; allowing further research on a greater number of countries with different 
standards and from other geo-economic areas. Thus, our findings might not be generalizable 
to other countries applying different standards or having different experiences in the adoption 
of IFRS. Next, is the nature of the Heckman two-step procedure; which does not offer a 
perfect solution to self-selection bias. Thus, care is required when analysing the results. The 
Heckman procedure depends heavily on the quality and the appropriateness of the data 
available for the selection model (first stage). If the amount of variance explained is relatively 
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low, then there is a possibility that selection bias in the outcomes equation (second stage) 
might not be detected. The Heckman procedure is also very sensitive to whether the selection 
model is correctly specified. If there is an omitted variable in this model (first stage), the 
inverse Mills ratio coefficient used in the valuation model (second stage) is biased, which 
could lead to inaccurate findings and biased estimates of the parameters used in the valuation 
model. Therefore, other possible reasons for a firm to engage or not in partial acquisitions 
(and have or not have controlling interests) should be considered. For example, Albuquerque 
and Wang (2008, p. 17) acknowledged that parent companies can hold subsidiaries for 
“nonpecuniary private benefits in the form of empire building or name recognition from 
managing larger firms” or the desire of founding family members to bequeath an “empire” 
bearing their name to their progeny. Further research could seek to incorporate these aspects, 
although it might be difficult from an empirical point of view. 
This study could also be criticized for disregarding the possibility of divergence 
between voting rights (control) and cash flow rights (ownership), which seems to be a 
relevant aspect since the level of resource appropriation by controlling shareholders is 
influenced by the magnitude of this divergence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1999). Claessens et al. (1999, 2002) were able to estimate the difference between cash flow 
rights and voting rights of firms in several East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999) 
examined the relationship of cash flow rights and voting rights with the valuation of firms. 
The findings of this latter study suggested a negative effect of voting rights on valuation but a 
positive effect of cash-flow rights.  
Our study focuses on the valuation of the controlling parent companies of the 
companies for which one would like to have information about the difference between cash 
flow rights and voting rights. The NCI ownership variable used in this study pertains to 
numerous subsidiaries, all included in the consolidated financial statements of the parent 
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company. Many of them can be unlisted companies, regarding which it would be very 
difficult for an investor in the parent company to collect information about the difference 
between cash flow and voting rights. In any case, it would be very difficult for a potential 
investor examining the consolidated statement of financial position to know exactly whether 
the amount of NCIs pertains to a large number of subsidiaries in each of which the cash flow 
rights are small or a small number of subsidiaries in each of which the cash flow rights are 
larger. In other words, it would be difficult for such an investor to collect the information 
required to incorporate into the valuation the possible effects of the wedge between voting 
and cash flow rights. 
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TABLE 1 
Prior literature on the association between NCI and share prices 
 
Authors 
Year of 
publication 
Country 
Sample 
Data period 
Summary of the association between 
NCI and share prices  
Conclusions 
Abad et al. 2000 Spain 1991-1997 Slight but positive association Slightly value relevant (positive) 
So and Smith 2009 Hong Kong  2004-2006 
Negatively associated before 2005, and 
no relationship thereafter  
Null relevance after adoption equivalent-to IAS standards: 
investors changed perceptions 
Swanson 2010 United States 1988-1994 
Larger firms: negative relationship but 
no statistical significance; smaller 
firms: positively associated; in 
between: negatively associated. 
Different value relevance (positive, negative and null) based 
on size characteristics 
 
Hsu et al.  2012 Taiwan  2000-2008 
Negatively associated before 2005 and 
thereafter 
Value relevant (negative) before and after new IAS definition 
of control: investors do not change perceptions  
Lopes et al.  2013 Germany 2002-2008 
Negatively associated before 2005 and 
thereafter 
Value relevant (negative) before and after new IAS 
presentation of NCI: investors do not change perceptions 
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TABLE 2 
Sample selection 
 
France Greece Sweden Germany UK 
Sample: Listed Companies using IFRS with market 
value available in the sample period 
529 228 198 416 1061 
(-) Listed Companies with negative NCI in at least one 
year in the sample period 
(13) (17) (0) (30) (6) 
(=)                                            Number of companies 516 211 198 386 1055 
Companies with NCI>0 every year 400 117 77 207 185 
Companies without NCI in any year 116 94 121 179 870 
Sample: Companies with NCI>0 every year: 
     
Companies using IFRS with market value available 400 117 77 207 185 
(-) Banks and other financial institutions (55) (18) (17) (47) (42) 
(-) Companies with non-positive shareholders’ equity (8) (21) (0) (1) (13) 
(-) Companies with data missing for the analysis (55) (20) (1) (4) (10) 
(=)                                        Number of companies 282 58 59 155 120 
Sample: companies without NCI in any year: 
     
Companies using IFRS, with market value available 116 94 121 179 870 
(-) Banks and other financial institutions (21) (12) (37) (20) (273) 
(-) Companies with non-positive shareholders’ equity (6) (18) (0) (5) (111) 
(-) Companies with data missing for the analysis (4) (15) (3) (10) (53) 
(=)                                        Number of companies 85 49 81 144 433 
This table shows the sample selection procedures by country. From top to bottom, the table shows the number of 
companies for which data were collected, dividing the sample into two partitions: with NCI every year and without NCI 
in any year. Banks and other financial institutions, companies with non-positive shareholder´s equity and with data 
missing were excluded in both partitions 
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TABLE 3 
Sample Description across Countries and Industries 
    firm-year 
observations 
With NCI Without NCI 
 N N % N % 
 
Panel A: Country breakdown 
 
France 
Greece 
Sweden 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
   
   
 
 
 
 
1,697 
640 
1,198 
1,799 
3,318 
8,652 
 
 
 
1,187 
347 
354 
930 
720 
3,538 
 
 
 
70% 
54% 
30% 
52% 
22% 
 
 
 
 
510 
293 
844 
869 
2,598 
5,114 
 
 
 
30% 
46% 
70% 
48% 
78% 
 
Panel B: Industry Breakdown 
 
France 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
Greece 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
Sweden  
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
 Germany 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
 United Kingdom 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services  
 
 
 
 
102 
800 
150 
150 
522 
1,697 
 
61 
272 
85 
132 
90 
640 
 
 
108 
576 
77 
89 
348 
1,198 
 
96 
929 
173 
132 
469 
1,799 
 
679 
1140 
222 
306 
971 
3,318 
 
 
 
 
90 
551 
114 
96 
336 
1,187 
 
36 
165 
49 
54 
43 
347 
 
 
30 
163 
36 
17 
108 
354 
 
66 
498 
102 
54 
210 
930 
 
150 
264 
60 
54 
192 
720 
 
 
 
8% 
46% 
10% 
8% 
28% 
100% 
 
10% 
48% 
14% 
16% 
12% 
100% 
 
 
9% 
46% 
10% 
5% 
30% 
100% 
 
7% 
54% 
11% 
6% 
22% 
100% 
 
21% 
36% 
8% 
8% 
27% 
100% 
 
 
 
12 
234 
30 
54 
180 
510 
 
25 
107 
36 
78 
47 
293 
 
 
78 
413 
41 
72 
240 
844 
 
30 
431 
71 
78 
111 
869 
 
529 
876 
162 
252 
779 
2,598 
 
 
 
2% 
46% 
6% 
11% 
35% 
100% 
 
9% 
36% 
12% 
27% 
16% 
100% 
 
 
9% 
49% 
5% 
9% 
28% 
100% 
 
3% 
50% 
8% 
9% 
30% 
100% 
 
20% 
34% 
6% 
10% 
30% 
100% 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Return, size, and leverage between groups 
 
 With NCI Without NCI Test for equality of 
means 
 Mean Mean T-test 
    
France 
    ROE 
    SIZE 
    LEV 
   Firm-year obs. 
 
 0.024 
12.778 
 0.204 
1,187 
 
-0.022 
10.239 
0.112 
510 
 
1.573 
21.341*** 
12.712*** 
Greece 
    ROE 
    SIZE 
    LEV 
   Firm-year obs. 
 
-0.075 
10.517 
 0.344 
347 
 
-0.040 
9.639 
0.257 
293 
 
-1.139 
6.605*** 
6.585*** 
Sweden 
    ROE 
    SIZE 
    LEV 
   Firm-year obs. 
 
 0.124 
12.797 
 0.185 
354 
 
-0,283 
10.059 
0.132 
844 
 
3.767*** 
22.774*** 
8.287*** 
Germany 
    ROE 
    SIZE 
    LEV 
   Firm-year obs. 
 
 0.036 
12.721 
 0.203 
930 
 
-0.121 
10.530 
 0.138 
869 
 
3.067*** 
22.774*** 
8.277*** 
United Kingdom  
    ROE 
    SIZE 
    LEV 
   Firm-year obs. 
 
 0.099 
12.963 
 0.182 
720 
 
-0.088 
10.598 
  0.120 
2,598 
 
12.389*** 
25.091*** 
9.704*** 
    
 
This table describes the sample by country and industry, and tests for differences in means between groups with and 
without NCI for selected variables. 
 
The main sample covers fiscal years 2008 to 2013. To be included in our sample, firms in each country must have all 
accounting and market variables available, non-negative NCI, and non-negative equity. We require information for 
six consecutive years and financial firms were excluded.  
 
The sample of firms without NCI are firms that do not report NCI in their consolidated financial statements for six 
consecutive years. The Industry breakdown is based on one-digit SIC Codes, namely Mining and Construction (SIC 
1000-1999); Manufacturing/Industrials (SIC 2000-3999); Utilities (SIC 4000-4999); Wholesale/Retail trade (SIC 
5000-5999); Services (SIC 7000-9999). 
 
ROE is a firm’s return on equity and is calculated as the net income attributable to common shareholders divided by 
the parent shareholders´ common equity, LEV is a firm’s leverage and is measured by dividing total liabilities by 
total assets, and SIZE is a measure of firm size, the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
 
 
41 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Selected Institutional Characteristics  
 
 
Panel A: Selected Institutional Characteristics by Country 
 
 Legal 
Origin/code law 
Cultural 
Region 
Anti-
director 
rights 
Ex-ante 
control 
Ex-post 
control 
Public 
enforcement 
Rule 
of law 
France French/civil WE 4 0.08 0.68 0.5 1.49 
Greece French/civil WE 2 0.08 0.35 0.5 0.75 
Sweden Scandinavian/civil WE 4 0.17 0.5 1 1.98 
Germany German/civil WE 4 0.14 0.43 1 1.91 
United Kingdom English/common ES 5 1 0.9 0 1.93 
 
Panel B: Selected Institutional Characteristics by Legal origin 
 
 Anti-director 
Index 
Ex-ante 
control 
Ex-post 
control 
Public 
enforcement 
Rule of 
law 
Average French/civil 2.86 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.37 
Average Scandinavian/civil 3.63 0.22 0.54 0.69 2.02 
Average German/civil 3.5 0.27 0.44 0.54 1.6 
Average English/common 4.22 0.58 0.74 0.35 0.8 
 
This table summarizes institutional characteristics. Panel A and Panel B are based on measures provided by Leuz 
(2010), based on Djankov et al. (2008) and other sources. Panel A denotes measures for each individual country, as 
reported in Leuz (2010):  Legal origin denotes the origin of the country´s legal system and is taken from Djankov et 
al. (2008), and we include similar classification (code law origin) as in La Porta (1997); Cultural Region is a 
classification of countries into major cultural groups based on Licht et al. (2007), separated by ES (English speaking) 
and WE (Western Europe); Anti-director rights is an aggregate measure of minority shareholders rights (higher 
values indicate more outside investor protection); Ex-ante control of self-dealing is the average of the requirements 
for approval by disinterested shareholders and ex-ante disclosure; Ex-post control of self-dealing is the average of 
disclosures in periodic filings and ease of providing wrongdoing; Public enforcement of anti-self-dealing provisions 
measures available, fines, and sanctions to the public enforcer; Rule of law index is an assessment of the overall legal 
quality and of law order in the country. Panel B presents the average for a larger number of countries grouped by 
different legal origins in which the five countries of Panel A are also included, as reported in Leuz (2010). 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for variables used in analyses 
 
Mean Median 
Stand. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Panel A: French civil-law countries  
 
France (N=1,187) 
MV 31.639 19.960 37.403 0.000 171.010 
BV 26.069 16.040 47.918 0.000 184.260 
NI 1.779 1.350 4.023 -42.360 26.870 
NCI 1.155 0.200 3.428 0.000 41.470 
LOSS 0.16     
AUD 0.64     
XLIST 0.14     
 
Greece (N=347) 
     
MV 2.043 1.020 2.654 0.100 23.400 
BV 2.692 2.333 1.961 0.021 17.329 
NI 0.026 0.013 0.531 -2.183 5.148 
NCI 0.191 0.061 0.254 0.000 1.757 
LOSS 0.47     
AUD 0.24     
XLIST 0.18     
 
Panel B: Scandinavian/German civil-law countries 
 
Sweden (N=354) 
MV 8.513 6.190 9.135 0.010 77.920 
BV 3.713 2.780 4.767 0.010 69.310 
NI 0.524 0.390 0.850 -2.890 8.500 
NCI   0.077 0.020 0.456 0.000 8.460 
LOSS 0.13     
AUD 0.96     
XLIST 0.12     
      
Germany (N=930)      
MV 23.440 15.435 23.665 0.280 159.400 
BV 14.731 10.890 13.272 0.150 75.280 
NI 1.320 0.850 2.471 -19.060 15.360 
NCI 0.818 0.170 1.631 0.000 12,520 
LOSS 0.18     
AUD 0.90     
XLIST 0.14     
      
Panel C: Common-Law Countries 
 
United Kingdom (N= 720) 
MV 3.608 2.194 4.106 0.034 22.990 
BV 1.823 1.302 1.614 0.004 7.747 
NI 0.222 0.158 0.332 -1.659 1.785 
NCI 0.075 0.018 0.161 0.000 1.347 
LOSS 0.18     
AUD 0.82     
XLIST 0.08     
All monetary values are in Euros. 
Sample: 1,187 firm year observations for France, 347 for Greece, 354 for Sweden, 930 for Germany, and 720 for the 
United Kingdom for the fiscal years 2008 to 2013. 
 (continued on next page) 
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Variables definition: MV is market value of equity per share at fiscal year end. BV is book value of equity per share 
attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in 
subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent 
company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is quoted in more than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise. 
 
The mean values for the variables LOSS, AUD, and XLIST represent the percentage of firms reporting losses, the 
percentage of firms audited by a BIG 4 audit firm, and the percentage of firms listed in more than one stock 
exchange, respectively.  
 
 
 
44 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Partial correlation between NCI and MV (OLS Regressions) 
 
  France   Greece   Sweden   Germany   United Kingdom 
Controlling for BV and NI: 
  MV   MV   MV   MV   MV 
 NCI 0.111  NCI 0.256  NCI -0.268  NCI -0.117  NCI -0.129 
 Sig. 0.000  Sig. 0.000  Sig. 0.000  Sig. 0.000  Sig. 0.000 
Controlling for all variables: 
  MV   MV   MV   MV   MV 
 NCI 0.072 
 
NCI 0.154 
 
NCI -0.124 
 
NCI -0.128  NCI -0.159 
  Sig. 0.013 
 
Sig. 0.005 
 
Sig. 0.023 
 
Sig. 0.000  Sig. 0.000 
 
Sample: The main sample of firms with NCI in their consolidated statements of financial position. There are 1,187 firm year 
observations for France, 347 for Greece, 354 for Sweden, 930 for Germany, and 720 for the United Kingdom for 
the fiscal years 2008 to 2013. 
 
Variables definition: MV is market value of equity per share at fiscal year end. BV is book value of equity per share attributable to 
parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per 
share not attributable to the parent.  
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TABLE 7 
Determinants for the use of NCI - Binary Logistic regression results 
 
    French civil-law countries  
Scandinavian/German civil-law 
countries 
 
Common law 
country 
 
All countries 
(Pooled) 
  France   Greece   Sweden   Germany    
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
  coef.   coef.   coef.   coef.   coef.  Coef. 
ROE   0.677     0.276     0.347     0.561     0.320    0.217 *** 
SIZE   0.540 ***   0.354 ***   0.598 ***   0.455 ***   0.480 ***  0.532 *** 
LEV   3.624 ***   4.323 ***   2.000 ***   1.943 ***   3.203 ***  2.125 *** 
PROT                                -0.774 *** 
ENF                 0.324 *** 
                   
Nagelkerke R2   0.334     0.242     0.453     0.276     0.370    0.393  
Max VIF  1.181   1.274   1.292   1.139   1.174   1.321  
N   1,697     640     1,198     1,799     3,318    8,652  
 
This table reports the results from Model (2) estimated using a binary logistic regression. Industry and year fixed 
effects are included. 
 
Sample: This estimation was run for a sample of 1,697 firm year-observations for France (1,187 with NCI and 510 
without NCI), 640 for Greece (347 with NCI and 293 without NCI), 1,198 for Sweden (354 with NCI and 844 
without NCI), 1,799 for Germany (930 with NCI and 869 without NCI), and 3,318 for the United Kingdom (720 with 
NCI and 2,600 without NCI) for the fiscal years 2008 to 2013.  
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is NCI_FIN, a binary variable that assumes 1 for firms reporting NCI 
every year during the entire sample period and 0 for firms who never reported NCI during the entire sample period. 
The covariates are: ROE is Return on Equity, calculated as the net income attributable to common shareholders 
divided by the parent shareholders´ common equity, LEV is leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets and SIZE is a measure of firm size, the natural logarithm of market capitalization. PROT is the anti-directors 
rights score and ENF is the public enforcement score, as reported in Panel A, Table 4. 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
OLS Regression Results – Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
  By country   
All countries 
(Pooled) 
  France   Greece   Sweden   Germany  United Kingdom   
Intercept -8.306  *   -0.616  *  -3.009 ***   -14.604 ***   -1.257 ***   -11.405 *** 
BV 0.211 ***   0.304 ***  1.340 ***   0.931 ***   0.711 ***   0.432 *** 
NI 6.752 ***   3.722 ***  1.708 ***   3.375 ***   6.992 ***   7.508 *** 
LOSS -0.729   -1.126   -0.312   0.807   0.732 ***  1.776 *** 
LOSSxNI -7.317 ***   -3.135 ***  -7.022 ***   -4.140 ***   -7.074 ***   -8.153 *** 
NCI 0.640 ***   0.999 ***  -2.248 **   -1.003 ***   -2.254 ***   0.522 *** 
HIGH                               0.500 
 
HIGHxNCI                               -0.806 ** 
                                    
CONTROLS:                                 
AUD Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes    
XLIST Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes    
Inv_Mills Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes    
IND Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes    
YEAR Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes    
                   
                                    
Adjusted R2 0.662   0.761   0.763   0.662   0.743   0.735 
 
Max VIF 2.735  3.665  5.613  3.627  2.704  4.177  
F-test 137.227***   66.757***   176.800***   137.227***   56.593***   510.934*** 
 
Sample: Firms with NCI reported in their consolidated financial statements, namely, 1,187 firm year observations for France, 347 for Greece, 
354 for Sweden, 930 for Germany, and 720 for the United Kingdom for the fiscal years 2008 to 2013. The pooled sample after exclusion 
of outliers (top and down 1% observations for each variable and absolute value of the studentized residuals of models (1), (4), and (5) higher than 3) 
is 3,500 firm year observations. 
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is MV, the market value of equity per share at fiscal year end. The independent variables are: BV is book 
value of equity per share attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. 
HIGH is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, and 0 for France and Greece.   
AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in more than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Inv_Mills is the Inverse of Mill’s ratio 
computed with the binary logistic model in the first stage, consistent with the Heckman (1979) procedure. IND and YEAR are industry and year 
variables. 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
OLS Regression Results - Hypothesis 3 
 
 
  All countries (Pooled) 
Intercept -11.155 *** 
BV .428 *** 
NI 7.482 *** 
LOSS 1.705 * 
LOSSxNI -8.114 *** 
NCI 0.545 *** 
HIGH 1.358 ** 
HIGHxNCI -0.576 ** 
HIGHEST -1.129 
 
HIGHESTxNCI -8.527 ** 
      
CONTROLS:     
AUD Yes    
XLIST Yes    
Inv_Mills Yes    
IND Yes    
YEAR Yes    
    
Adjusted R2 0.735   
Max VIF 4.188  
F-test 463.579***   
Sample: Firms with NCI reported in consolidated financial statements in all countries, namely, 1,187 firm year 
observations for France, 347 for Greece, 354 for Sweden, 930 for Germany, and 720 for the United Kingdom for the 
fiscal years 2008 to 2013. The pooled sample after exclusion of outliers (top and down 1% observations for each variable and 
absolute value of the studentized residuals of models (1), (4) and (5) higher than 3) is 3,500 firm year observations. 
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is MV, the market value of equity per share at fiscal year-end. The 
independent variables are: BV is book value of equity per share attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income 
per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with 
negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. 
HIGH is an indicator variables that takes the value of 1 for United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, and 0 for France 
and Greece.  HIGHEST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for United Kingdom and 0 otherwise, 
AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 
otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in more than one stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise. Inv_Mills is the Inverse of Mill’s ratio computed with the binary logistic model in the first 
stage, consistent with the Heckman (1979) procedure. IND and YEAR are industry and year variables. 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
